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Labour Market Policy and Labour Law Reforms
in Germany: Towards Inclusive Growth
Günther SCHMID*
This article, first, provides a comprehensive overview of German labour market policy and labour
law reforms since the beginning of this millennium and assesses to what extent Germany is
pursuing the principles of inclusive growth, accompanied by selective evidence of their consequences
for the German labour market performance. A stylized and descriptive overview of the inclusive
impact of these reforms in quantitative and qualitative terms follows, complemented finally with
an essay reflecting the concept of the inclusive labour contract.
1 INTRODUCTION: THE PARDIGM SHIFT TOWARDS INCLUSION
In March 2010 the European Council declared the new European Employment
Strategy (EU2020) with three overriding objectives: smart, sustainable and inclu-
sive growth. Related to inclusion, by 2020 all EU-Member States shall strive for an
the employment rate of 75% for people in age twenty to sixty-four; for a school
dropout rate of less than 10%; for a rate of at least 40% with an academic degree
related to the thirty to thirty-four age cohort; and – last, but not least – for a
reduction of poverty by at least 20 million people.1 As the specification of these
objectives shows, the new employment strategy did not fully reflect the ambi-
tions stated in the famous 2008-UN-Convention on the rights of persons with
disabilities based on the principles of inclusion.2 The preamble of this convention
lucidly emphasizes the intended paradigm shift: Instead of viewing persons with
disabilities as ‘objects’ of charity, medical treatment and social protection, persons
with disabilities should be viewed as ‘subjects’ with rights, who are capable of
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1 European Commission, Europe 2020 – A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth,
Communication from the Commission, Brussels, 3 Apr. 2010, COM (2010) 2020.
2 United Nations, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)(2008), http://www.un.
org/disabilities/documents/convention/convoptprot-e.pdf (accessed 29 Nov. 2018).
claiming those rights and making decisions for their lives based on their free and
informed consent as well as being active members of society.
In this article I argue that this perspective of inclusion can and should also
serve as the new paradigm of labour market policy and labour law related to all
persons intending to fully participate in the labour market. Apart from neglect-
ing the target group of persons with disabilities, the EU2020 documents were
concentrating on quantitative targets without embedding the corresponding
instruments to reach these targets into a new legal framework. Only recently,
the ‘solemn’ proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights by the
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in Gothenbourg on
17 November 2017 tried to fill this gap with currently uncertain perspectives of
its realization.3 For a critical review of German labour market policies and
labour law reforms, it is therefore necessary to start with a brief definition of
inclusion to set a clear framework for a normative assessment in addition to
conventional objectives of labour market policy. The following four principles
of inclusions are derived from the concept of transitional labour markets
(TLM).4
First, concerning the right to gainful work, I consider ‘labour market security’
as the overall objective of inclusive growth. In contrast to the growth objective
reflected in the EU2020 strategy, inclusion implies not to maximize employment
as such but to minimize unemployment, among others through protected flex-
ibility of employment relationships, maintenance of jobs through internal flexibil-
ity and public job guarantees. Second, concerning equal treatment, a strong
emphasis should be put on the strategy of making the market fit to workers in
order to overcome the various restrictions of individual earning capacities over the
life course, in particular due to unpaid social work obligations and disabilities,
among others through reasonable adjustment of work-places. Third, concerning
the labour market status, inclusive growth emphasizes early access to gainful work
and voice through negotiated flexibility, above all through co-determination in
collective agreements at firm, regional or branch level. Fourth, concerning social
protection, inclusive growth would accentuate social insurance principles with
3 European Commission, European Pillar of Social Rights, Luxembourg (2017), https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/sites/beta-political/files/social-summit-european-pillar-social-rights-booklet_en.pdf.
4 The Dynamics of Full Employment. Social Integration Through Transitional Labour Markets (Günther Schmid
& Bernard Gazier eds, Edward Elgar 2002); Bernard Gazier, ‘Tous Sublimes’ – Vers un nouveau plein-
emploi, Flammarion; The European Social Model and Transitional Labour Markets – Law and Policy (Ralf
Rogowski ed., Ashgate 2008); Günther Schmid, Transitional Labour Markets: Theoretical Foundations and
Policy Strategies, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 1–15 (2017); https://link.springer.com/
referenceworkentry/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_3050-2; Günther Schmid, Towards an Employment
Strategy of Inclusive Growth, in Reframing Global Social Policy – Social Investment for Sustainable and Inclusive
Growth, Policy Press 145–87 (Christopher Deeming & Paul Smith eds, 2017); Günther Schmid,
Europa in Arbeit: Plädoyer für eine neue Vollbeschäftigung durch inklusives Wachstum (Campus 2018).
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strong elements of ex ante redistribution through shared contributions to health,
pension and unemployment insurance; this would, among others, allow antic-
yclical (‘breathing’) unemployment benefits or short-time work allowances to
stabilize effective demand in cyclical troughs.
The following of this study is structured into two parts: First, an encom-
passing overview of the German labour market policy and labour law reforms is
given, complemented by an assessment of their inclusion impact in quantitative
and qualitative terms compared to the overall development in Europe. The
results of this exercise hint to a potential trade-off between quantitative and
qualitative aspects of inclusion into the labour market, which raises the question
of how to possibly overcome conflicting objectives. The second and shorter
part of this study, therefore, reflects on the necessary relaunch of the institu-
tional framework for ensuring the multiple aspects of inclusive growth. As the
legal dimension of the employment relationship is the central pillar of labour
market institutions, I suggest the concept of an inclusive labour contract as
regulatory idea for managing the increasing complexity of labour relations over
the life course. A brief summary concludes.
2 THE GERMAN LABOUR MARKET POLICY AND LAW REFORMS
The recent German labour market reforms are commonly subsumed under the
so-called ‘Hartz reforms’ adopted in 2003 and 2004.5 Despite their prominence,
other – and some even more important – reforms have to be mentioned under
the perspective of inclusive growth. The structure of the following part follows
the analytical framework of TLM which distinguishes five main risks of exclu-
sion – the reverse to inclusion – over the life course: (1) School to work
transitions with the risk of insufficient earnings capacities; (2) job-to-job transi-
tions or transitions between standard and non-standard employment with the risk
of precarious jobs and volatile or too low earnings; (3) transitions between
employment and unemployment with the risk of downward careers or even
being permanently excluded; (4) transitions between family work or own work
and employment with the risk of restricted earnings capacities and career inter-
ruption; (5) transitions between employment and inactivity due to old age or
disablement with the risk of reduced earnings or even total loss of any earnings
capacities.
5 Due to the fact that chancellor Schröder did not follow the proposals by the Hartz Commission in
some important respects, I will talk of the ‘Schröder reforms’ in the following; see Werner Jann &
Günther Schmid, Eins zu Eins? Eine Zwischenbilanz der Hartz-Reformen am Arbeitsmarkt, edition sigma;
Günther Schmid, Übergänge am Arbeitsmarkt: Arbeit, nicht nur Arbeitslosigkeit versichern, edition sigma
2011, http://www.nomos-shop.de/25483.
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2.1 SCHOOL-TO-WORK TRANSITIONS
With respect to school-to-work transitions, there has been no basic labour market
reform. The main reason is that the German system of school-to-work transitions
already widely corresponds to the principles of inclusive growth. The dual system in
the form of apprenticeship or tertiary vocational training combines theoretical with
practical education as well as learning with gainful work, which means that young
people can earn some part of their living while still being trained and educated for full
earnings capacities. Inclusion into the labour market measured by total employment
even increased among youth and young adults, and youth unemployment is one of the
lowest in Europe (Table 1).
This does not mean, however, that this system is without flaws. Even many of
those who are included suffer, for instance, through an increase in non-standard
forms of employment6 and from low apprenticeship allowances. The new grand
coalition Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union and Social
Democratic Party Information and Communication Technology (CDU/CSU
and SPD) therefore intends to establish a minimum allowance for apprentices in
order to increase the falling motivation to take up an apprenticeship and to stop
the trend of young people entering university even though they lack the cognitive
capacities, facing therefore the risk of failure: about one-third of beginners cur-
rently drop out after two years, in particular in science subjects like mathematics,
physics, chemistry and ICT.
The flip side of the coin is that the successful inclusion for most young
people into the labour market has negative repercussions for those who face
disadvantages in terms of physical capacities (e.g. disabilities), ethnic back-
ground (e.g. deficits in language and communication abilities) or lack of
endowments with basic cognitive skills (e.g. reading, mathematics). Many of
these disadvantaged remain stuck in the complex transition system maintained
by labour market policy measures. In 2015, 6% of youth finished school with-
out a certificate, and 13.4% of youth aged twenty to thirty-four were without a
vocational training certificate (in total, almost two million); for those with a
migration background this percentage is 29.8%.7 So, almost two million young
adults are excluded from sustainable labour market careers. On the positive
side, however, legal reforms in recent decades have opened the access to
universities also to youth with certified vocational training; the negative side
is that those people without an occupational degree still never have the chance
to enter universities.
6 Which increased by 6.7 percentage points from 1998 to 2016, whereas the standard employment rate
decreased by 3.5% (Table 1).
7 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, Berufsbildungsbericht, 10 & 50 (2017).
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Table 1 Indicators of Inclusion into the German Labour Market 1998, 2008, 2016
(Compared to EU28): Employment (ER) and Unemployment Rates (UR) for Different
Categories as Percent of Population in the Respective Working Age (Total: 15–69)
Indicator 1998 2008 2016 Difference
(2016–1998)
Total ER (15–69)
Youth ER (15–29)
Core ER (30–59)
Women ER (15–69)
Elderly ER (60–69)
Total Standard ER
Youth St-ER (15–29)
Core St-ER (30–59)
Women St-ER (15–69)
Elderly St-ET (60–69)
Total Nonstandard ER
Youth Nst-ER (15–29)
Core Nst-ER (30–59)
Women Nst-ER (15–69)
Elderly Nst-ER (60–69)
Total UR (15–69)
Youth UR (15–29)
Core UR (30–59)
Women UR (15–69)
Elderly UR (60–69)
65.1 (62.2)
60.0 (55.8)
81.0 (76.8)
56.9 (53.1)
13.3 (16.0)
37.2 (35.4)
30.0 (28.2)
48.5 (46.4)
25.3 (26.3)
5.6 (5.0)
21.6 (20.5)
24.5 (18.6)
24.2 (24.0)
25.7 (20.6)
6.9 (10.4)
6.4 (6.3)
5.5 (9.0)
8.2 (6.3)
6.0 (6.3)
0.9 (0.7)
69.9 (65.9)
61.6 (57.1)
85.7 (80.9)
63.3 (58.7)
21.2 (20.9)
35.9 (37.1)
23.6 (27.1)
48.3 (48.7)
24.0 (28.9)
8.9 (8.2)
28.3 (24.1)
32.0 (23.0)
31.5 (27.6)
34.4 (25.4)
10.8 (11.9)
5.2 (4.7)
6.0 (7.0)
5.9 (4.8)
4.9 (4.5)
1.5 (0.8)
72.7 (67.5)
61.4 (55.8)
86.9 (83.5)
68.2 (61.8)
38.8 (28.2)
39.0 (36.6)
26.5 (23.8)
50.3 (48.8)
26.9 (29.5)
17.0 (12.3)
30.7 (25.1)
31.2 (23.7)
33.4 (28.7)
38.7 (26.9)
20.3 (14.3)
3.0 (5.8)
3.8 (8.3)
3.1 (6.1)
2.6 (5.5)
1.4 (1.5)
7.6 (5.3)
1.4 (0.0)
5.9 (6.7)
11.3 (8.7)
25.5 (12.2)
1.8 (1.2)
- 3.5 (- 4.4)
1.8 (2.4)
1.6 (3.2)
11.4 (7.3)
9.1 (4.6)
6.7 (5.1)
9.2 (4.7)
13.0 (6.3)
13.4 (3.9)
- 3.4 (- 0.5)
- 1.7 (- 0.7)
- 5.1 (- 0.3)
- 3.4 (- 0.8)
0.5 (0.8)
Source: European Labour Force Survey, own calculations; see Günther Schmid, Europa in Arbeit, supra note
4; and Günther Schmid & Johannes Wagner, Atypische Beschäftigung in Europa: Auswertung der Daten der
Europäischen Beschäftigtenstichprobe,
http://www.guentherschmid.eu/pdf/discussion/EU__Arbeit_Datenband_G%FCS_JW-2018.pdf.
Note: In contrast to official statistics, all figures are as percent of the population in working age fifteen to sixty-
nine (or respectively, e.g. fifteen to twenty-nine, thirty to fifty-nine, sixty to sixty-nine). The advantage of this
denominator is, first, its nonaffection by the nominator; second the total is the sum of its components, e.g. the
German total employment rate in 2016 (72.7% of working age population fifteen to sixty-nine) is the sum of
the total standard employment rate (39.0%), the total nonstandard employment rate (30.7%) and the total
unemployment rate (3.0%). Standard employment is defined as employment in open-ended, dependent and full-
time work contracts; non-standard employment is a composition of part-time, temporary and self-employment
controlled by overlaps.
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2.2 JOB-TO-JOB TRANSITIONS
Under the flag of ‘flexicurity’, in Germany renamed to ‘Fördern and Fordern’
(promoting and demanding), the German labour market reforms advanced three
types of non-standard employment (NSE): self-employment, temporary jobs (in
particular through temp-agency work), and marginal jobs.8 Before going into
details, however, the reader shall be reminded that one reason for the low labour
turnover in Germany, compared for instance to Denmark, is internal flexibility, in
particular through working-time flexibility either in the form of collective agree-
ments or in the form of short-time working. Both measures were heavily used as
adjustment measures in the crisis of 2008/09 and correspond, in broad terms at
least, to the principles of inclusive growth.9
(1) The Schroeder reforms invented a new start-up subsidy (´Ich-AG´) that
supplemented the already existing bridging allowance (Überbrückungsgeld, since
1986), which capitalized unemployment benefit entitlements in order to support
the unemployed in setting up their own businesses.10 The Ich-AG paid a relatively
generous but decreasing lump sum for three years, provided the recipient’s annual
income did not exceed EUR 25,000. The take-up of this instrument was much
higher than expected. For the unemployed, the subsidy was a temptation to escape
the ‘demanding’ threats of the Public Employment Service (PES), and from the
perspective of employers, the possibility of buying the services of a self-employed
instead of hiring a dependent employed person is always an attractive option, since
dismissal protection does not apply to this category of workers. Furthermore,
bureaucratic thresholds for employment creation were loosened: all business
start-ups had the option of hiring additional employees on the basis of fixed-
term contracts for up to four years.
Even though evaluation research has given credit to this component of the
Schröder reforms, the Ich-AG scheme was abolished in 2006 and merged with the
more efficient bridging allowance to create an overall Start-up Allowance
(Gründungszuschuss) for the unemployed. Since then, the take-up of this measure
remained at a level of around 140,000 up to the end of 2011 when – in the vein of
8 For the ‘flexicurity’ concept see Per K. Madsen, How Can it Possibly Fly? The Paradox of a Dynamic
Labour Market, in National Identity and the Varieties of Capitalism, The Danish Experience 321–55 (J. L.
Campbell, J. A. Hall & O. K. Pedersen eds, McGill-Queen’s University Press 2006); and Ton
Wilthagen & Frank Tros, The Concept of Flexicurity: A New Approach to Regulating Employment and
Labour Markets, 10 Transfer 166–86 (2004).
9 As these labour market instruments are familiar to the scientific community, I abstain from further
explanations and details; for further references see Günther Schmid, Sharing Risks of Labour Market
Transitions: Towards a System of Employment Insurance, 53(1) Brit. J. of Indus. Rel. 70–93 (2015), http://
www.guentherschmid.eu/pdf/Sharing_Risks_BJIR-2015.pdf.
10 This measure, of course, also belongs to the section on transitions between employment and
unemployment.
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overall budget cuts – the regulation was sharply tightened: most important was the
change from a so-called ‘obligatory measure’ (Pflichtmaßnahme) to a discretionary
measure (Ermessensmaßnahme). In Germany an ‘obligatory’ measure means having
the right to be promoted to self-employment if certain conditions are fulfilled. At the
end of the day this means that the worker can go to court to claim his or her
right.11 A ‘discretionary’ measure means that it remains up to the administrator to
decide on the measure depending on the labour market or – more com-
monly – budgetary conditions. The new discretionary measure was further tigh-
tened by the requirement that potential beneficiaries still have to be entitled to at
least 150 days of insurance-related unemployment benefits (ALG I). Unemployed
who already exhausted these days, i.e. the long-term unemployed, were thus
excluded.
The current two basic features of the new start-up measure for the unem-
ployed are topping up, in the first six-month phase, the unemployment benefits by
300 Euro monthly so as to ensure the social security contributions of the self-
employed; during the following second phase of nine months (after a judgment of
whether the start-up will likely be sustainable), the beneficiary only receives the
monthly allowance of 300 Euro. The result of this reform was a sharp drop in the
number of participants, down to around 25,000. The PES now plans to revitalize
the measure by doubling the targeted budget, not least due to quite positive
evaluations of this measure.12
(2) Although marginal forms of employment existed even before the year
2000, the Schröder reforms (2003–2005) intended to ease the transition from
unemployment or inactivity to standard employment through so-called ‘minijobs’
and ‘midijobs’.13 Other objectives were also envisaged, for instance, the curtailment
of illegal work, especially in private households.
Prior to the former reforms, full social insurance contributions became man-
datory for the main form of minijobs at the current level of up to 450 Euro per
month.14 The employer, however, pays the bulk of these contributions: roughly
11 The success of short-time work goes back, among others, to still being an ‘obligatory’ measure, i.e. a
right for the workers. Even works councils are entitled to apply for short-time work at the PES.
12 Stefan Bernhard, Katalin Evers & Michael Grüttner, Der Gründungszuschuss nach seiner gesetzlichen
Neuregelung: Die Folgen des Kurswechsels, in IAB-Kurzbericht 21, Nürnberg (2015); Verónica
Escudero, Are Active Labour Market Policies Effective in Activating and Integrating Low-skilled Individuals?
An International Comparison, 7(4) IZA J. Lab. Pol’y (2018), open access: https://izajolp.springeropen.
com/.
13 Midijobs are jobs with an income between 451 Euro and 850 Euro monthly; employers pay full social
insurance contributions (‘only’ about 21%), whereas employees’ contributions increase linearly until
they reach the regular rate of 21% at 850 Euro; in total there are only about 1.3 million midijobs.
14 300 Euros in 2003. There are also time-limited minijobs with the limit of three months, unlimited in
terms of income per year, and without any contributions to social security, but playing only a minor
role (their number declined from 286,000 (2003) to 184,000 (2016)).
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30% shared among the main insurance categories (15% goes towards the pension
system, 13% to the health insurance; the rest to other items). Employees contribute
4% of their earnings, but they can opt out, and most of them do.15 Mini-jobbers
are not covered by unemployment insurance as both sides pay no contributions;
they also do not acquire health insurance coverage; but most mini-jobbers are
covered by derived entitlements (i.e. through the parents or working spouses in
regular employment).
As a key element of the reform, the fifteen-hour limit on weekly working
hours has been abolished. Hence, marginal employment can be carried out in
addition to regular employment without becoming subject to social security contributions
for employees. This exemption can hardly be justified with respect to the princi-
ples of inclusion:
(1) First, it privileges insiders who already have a standard employment
relationships and potentially excludes those without any job.
(2) Second, it also makes it harder for mini-jobbers to transit into regular
jobs because insiders who might move to better-paid jobs (or strive to
move!) stay put as they have the chance of an additional untaxed
income.
(3) Third, it serves as a Trojan horse for creating jobs with low wages
because workers who already have a regular income are more willing
to take low-paid side-jobs.
(4) Fourth, people who minijob in private household services (including
Haushaltschecks) perversely cross-subsidize well-earning households
through low wages.
(5) Fifth, minijobs – last but not least – lead to foregone tax revenues and
social security contributions in the range of around 4 billion Euro per
year, which can be regarded as the costs of subsiding minijobs.
The total number of minijobs increased from 6 million in 2003 to 7.6 million in
2016. Whereas minijobs as the only source of income has declined slightly since
the year 2009 (from 5.3 to 4.9 million), minijobs as a side-job more than doubled
from 1.2 to 2.7 million. Minijobs as a percentage of total jobs, however, declined
due to the favourable development of regular jobs, which might be interpreted as
an indicator of the limited substitution effect (minijobs substituting regular jobs),
and possibly even as an indicator of the complementarity of minijobs and regular
jobs – a speculation which needs further research.
15 For further valuable details see Nicola Düll, Case Study: Gaps in Access to Social Protection for Mini-jobs in
Germany, Publications Office of the European Union (2018).
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The overall evaluation of marginal employment by employer representatives
turns out to be positive: Minijobs are recognized as a cost-efficient and very
flexible measure for dealing with peak periods and extended opening hours. In
this context, competitive branches such as retail, cleaning, catering and tourism,
but also private households, take advantage of this measure. In particular, small
businesses appreciate the aspect of a flexible and rapid use of marginal employment
at relatively low costs. Whereas these aspects already existed before 2003, the
Schröder reforms abolished the limitation on weekly working hours for mini-
jobbers and thus helped to strengthen internal numerical flexibility. The tripling of
declared marginal employment in private households (from about 100,000 to
approximately 300,000) may serve as a further indicator of the success of this
strategy. Private household employers, however, are subsidized twice through the
‘Household check’ procedure: they have to pay lower taxes and social security
contributions, and they can deduct the expenses from their income tax duties.16
From the employees’ and trade unions’ point of view, however, there is great
concern about minijobs offering employers the possibility to substitute regular
employment and keep outsiders in a low-income and dead-end trap which also
eventually leads to low social security entitlements and poverty in old age.
Transition rates to standard employment are low, thus, minijobs cannot be
regarded as an adequate bridge into regular employment. On the positive side,
however, it should also be mentioned that young (under twenty-five) and elderly
people (over fifty-five) are overrepresented among the mini-jobbers. Persons
belonging to these ‘marginal’ age groups can be considered as special target groups
for inclusive growth because they might be (in the case of education or in the
event of early retirement) predominantly interested in uncomplicated additional
income sources and less in additional employment or social protection.17
(3) The Schröder reforms also deregulated one important part of temporary jobs,
i.e. temp-agency work, or the triangular form of temporary employment relation-
ships. Prior to this reform, the Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz of 2000 (implementing
the EU directive for part-time work) eased the arrangement of fixed-term work
contracts. The intention was, again, to mobilize job-to-job transitions in general
and the transition from unemployment to employment in particular. Temporary
contracts altogether increased since then from about 5.2 (2002) to 8.3 (2017)%.
They are strongly related to first jobs, in particular of young people. According to
most recent figures (2017), 42% transit after the end of the contract into regular
employment, 36% into extension of the fixed-term contract, and 25% are
16 For further detailed information, again, visit the excellent study by Düll, supra n. 15.
17 61% of persons whose minijob is the main job are below 25 or older than 55; among the mini-jobbers
in side-jobs this percentage is only 28.
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terminated. The current grand coalition government intends to reduce substan-
tially fixed-term contracts without a given reason (about 50% of all contracts), yet
it remains open whether this gets into ‘real law’ without compromises towards the
many employers who disagree. There are even good reasons, to rely more on
economic incentives through internalizing the costs of higher unemployment risks
through variations in contributions to unemployment insurance.18
The Schröder reforms almost completely deregulated temp-agency work (or
Leiharbeit, Arbeitnehmerüberlassung) only with the remaining provision that the
employment relationships shall be controlled by collective agreements. Under
this provision, collective agreements even allowed to deviate from the principle
of equal treatment – a form of regulation which bluntly violates the inclusion
principles. Furthermore, the government at that time did not expect that the
competition between trade union representatives in the temp-agency sector
would develop into a harsh power battle between unions under the umbrella of
the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) and unions under the umbrella of Christliche
Gewerkschaften Zeitarbeit und PersonalServiceAgenturen (CGZP). For instance, a col-
lective agreement of the so-called Christian [sic!]Trade Union allowed Schlecker (a
former German employer in retailing which has since gone bankrupt) to close
many shops and rehire the workers through a dubious temp-agency firm which
paid its workers 30% lower wages than before and provided much less generous
fringe benefits like holidays and Christmas payments. This led to a charge against
CGZP by ver.di (a large DGB trade union) which eventually succeeded because
the CGZP did not fulfil the clause on representing the majority of the correspond-
ing retail workers.
In the meantime, the so-called Tarifautonomiestärkungsgesetz of July 2014
established a mandatory minimum wage of 8.50 Euro since January 2015. The
newly established and since then responsible commission for setting the minimum
wage increased this level successively to 8.84 Euro (2017), 9.19 Euro (2019), and
9.35 Euro (2020). The new wage floor brought significant increases for low-paid
employees at limited observable negative employment effects thus far, thereby
solving many problems related to temp-agency work.19
Temp-agency work (officially Leiharbeit) has increased rapidly from a level of
about 200,000 to over one million since 2015, however, with a lower speed than
before. Although its share of employment reaches only 2.8%, 14% of transitions
18 Figures reported by Christian Hohendanner, Reform der befristeten Beschäftigung im Koalitionsvertrag.
Reichweite, Risiken und Alternativen, Nürnberg, IAB-Kurznachrichten 16 (2018), also critically assessing
the implications of the suggested reform and discussing alternatives.
19 Oliver Bruttel, Arne Baumann & Matthias Dütsch, The New German Statutory Minimum Wage in
Comparative Perspective: Employment Effects and Other Adjustment Channels, 1 Eur. J. Indus. Rel. 1–18
(2017).
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into unemployment and 19% of transitions from unemployment into employment
come from temp-agency workers.
Nowadays, Leiharbeit is commonly accepted as a legitimized instrument of
flexibility for employers and the overall economy. The social and even the
economic risks connected with this employment relationship, however, are still
not managed satisfactorily. For employees, the risk of unemployment is almost five
times higher than for regular employees (3.06 v. 0.63), but only a minority of
temp-agency workers are covered by UI; most of them receive only means tested
basic income (Hartz IV).20 Furthermore, many temp-agency workers are low-
wage earners; 5% of temp-agency workers (with 75% working full-time!) receive
additional Hartz IV transfers, compared to 2% of ‘regular’ workers. Average wages
of temp-agency workers are far below those of regular workers. Approximately
50% of temp-agency workers are contracted out for less than three months. The
envisaged stepping stone function – transitions from temp-agency work to regular
work – is rather modest (at most for about 20%); for unemployed, however, these
stepping stones are at least marginally better than for those who do not use this
opportunity.21
From an inclusive point of view, however, three features of current temp-
agency work in Germany are still quite problematic
(1) First, even the recent reform of the Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz
(21 February 2017) did not fully establish the equal treatment princi-
ple. Equal pay only has to be realized after nine months of continuous
employment (in 2017, only 30% of temp-agency workers reached this
level), and collective agreements can even legitimize unequal pay for
up to fifteen months.
(2) Second, although the new regulation now stipulates the maximal
duration of ‘Entleihung’ at eighteen months (the Schröder regulation
set no time limit at all), practically it is still possible to recruit the same
temp-agency workers permanently: a break of three months after
eighteen months (probably bridged by unemployment benefits) is
enough to rehire the same worker. Thus, the rationale for temp-
agency – that it should only temporarily bridge the lack of a workforce
(typically seasonal or replacing workers on parental leave) – is bluntly
violated. Temp-agency work still opens the door for lower rather than
regular wages and de facto discrimination against workers.
20 Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Aktuelle Entwicklungen in der Zeitarbeit, Nürnberg (2018).
21 Florian Lehmer & Kerstin Ziegler, Brückenfunktion der Leiharbeit – Zumindest ein schmaler Steg, Nürnberg
IAB-Kurzbericht 13 (2010).
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(3) The negative indirect economic repercussions of this regulation should
not be underestimated, as employers have a convenient instrument of
flexibility with this measure. They can relax and neglect long-term
investments in a larger part of their staff, thus deepening the cleavage
between insiders and outsiders. Furthermore, the expected overall
impact on productivity, innovation and competitiveness is more than
doubtful: both microeconomic and macroeconomic research hints
more towards a negative impact.22
The overall inclusive impact of reforms related to job-to-job transitions is reflected
in the changing labour market participation of the core working age group (thirty
to fifty-nine) which improved at the aggregate level from 81% (1998) to 86.9%
(2016) and is substantially higher than for EU28 (Table 1). Only a minor part of
this growth, however, was due to there being more people in regular jobs at a level
corresponding to the EU28 average; most of this growth is related to the increase
of non-standard labour force participation from 24.2 to 33.4%. On the other hand,
unemployment started to go down at about the same time by 5.1% age points from
8.2 to 3.1% whereas unemployment for this age group at the EU28 level remained
almost constant (6.4 v. 6.1%).
2.3 TRANSITIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT
The key part of the Schröder reforms was directed towards speeding the transition
from unemployment to employment in general and preventing long-term unem-
ployment in particular through the ‘modernisation of labour market services’.23 Apart
from the already mentioned ‘Ich-AGs’ (transitions from unemployment to self-
employment) and the minijobs (thought of as stepping stones to regular jobs), these
reforms consisted of five main elements (‘Module’), which can be presented here
only in summarized form.
(1) The first part of the administrative reforms can be subsumed under the
strategy to activate the unemployed through ‘promoting and demanding’ (‘Fördern und
Fordern’) measures. The promoting measures were mainly an improvement of
placement services, especially through systematic profiling of inflowing unem-
ployed for individual case management as well as a larger and better-trained staff
responsible for placement services and employment promotion. The demanding
measures mainly consisted of tightening the rules on accepting a ‘suitable’ job, in
22 See Schmid, Europa in Arbeit, supra n. 4, at 69–76.
23 Peter Hartz et al., Moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt. Vorschläge der Kommission zum Abbau der
Arbeitslosigkeit und zur Umstrukturierung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Bundesministerium für Arbeit und
Sozialordnung (2002).
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reducing unemployment benefit duration for older people combined with restrict-
ing early retirement through pension regulations which now foresee an actuarial
reduction of benefits. It is – at least partly – due to these new regulations that in the
course of the economic upswing the employment rates of elderly employees have
starkly risen (Table 1).
(2) Services to employers were improved through time-budget allocation for
such services (at least 20% of the agencies’ time) and ‘premium’ clients, faster
reaction times, prior contacts to both employers and jobseekers, referral of a
limited number of qualified contacts, follow-up contacts, an improved vacancy
database and monitoring the matching process. The central goal lies in obtaining
employers’ attention and willingness to cooperate and, thus, increasing the share of
notified vacancies. These measures have also considerably improved matching
efficiency.24
(3) The reform also emphasized privatization in the form of the outside
provision of placement services. Most of the corresponding instruments, however,
especially the Personnel Service Agencies (PSA), were not successful.25
(4) The core, albeit ambivalent, of the reform was the merging of unemployment
assistance and social assistance. Prior to the reform, the PES administered two types of
benefits, which de facto defined its clientele for active measures: unemployment
benefits (Arbeitslosengeld), which provided payments at a level of 67% (unemployed
with children) or 60% (unemployed without children) of previous net wages for
twelve months (or up to thirty-two months for older employees), and unemploy-
ment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) after eligibility for regular unemployment benefits
had expired. Unlike unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance was means-
tested, amounted to 53 to 57% of previous net wages, and was paid for an
unlimited period as long as PES could not provide a ‘suitable’ job. A third type
of benefit was the so-called social assistance (Sozialhilfe), in other words, means-
tested benefits at the subsistence level. Social assistance for unemployed people
who were not eligible for PES benefits was funded and administered by the local
authorities, the counties and the larger municipalities. This complex system of
benefit provision had many problematic consequences for the supply of job-
brokering and other active measures in particular for the long-term unemployed.
The institutional responsibility for them shifted from PES to the municipalities and
24 One of these studies came to the conclusion that the organizational reforms explain about 20% of the
decrease in unemployment, whereas the reform of unemployment benefits explains only about 5%, cf.
Andrey Launova & Klaus Wälde, The Employment Effect of Reforming a Public Employment Agency, 84
Eur. Econ. Rev. 140–64 (2016).
25 Doris Hess, Petra Kaps & Hugh Mosley, Implementation und Wirkungsanalyse der Personal-Service-Agentur,
75 DIW-Vierteljahreshefte 9–31 (2006).
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back to PES, so that some experts labelled this system as an ‘organised
irresponsibility’.
The Schröder reforms overhauled this governance confusion by replacing
unemployment assistance with ‘basic (income) security’ (Grundsicherung, or
Arbeitslosengeld II). ALG II, better known as Hartz IV, is a means-tested and flat-
rate allowance for all jobseekers who are not entitled to unemployment benefits,
no matter whether they are clients of the local authorities (formerly social assistance
recipients) or clients of the PES (formerly unemployment benefit recipients). The
reform established thereby two completely separate regulatory systems
(‘Rechtskreise’) for jobseekers: with the Sozialgesetzbuch III (SGB III) setting the
rules for ALG I recipients and the Sozialgesetzbuch II (SGB II) setting the rules for
Hartz IV recipients. Most importantly, from an inclusive growth perspective, is the
fact that the definition of an employable jobseekers was extended. All those who
are able to work at least three hours per day are now ‘employable’ and fall under
the ‘regulatory circle’ of SGB II.
The current level of social protection for jobseekers outside the unemploy-
ment insurance system in the narrower sense (ALG I) is the following (January
2018): For a needy single unemployed person, Hartz IV pays an allowance of 416
Euro per month; married adults receive 90% (374 Euro). In the case of an
unemployed family with two children (four and twelve years old), the family
may receive altogether: 2x374 Euro + 240 Euro (child four years old) + 296
Euro (child twelve years old) + 644 Euro (accommodation and heating) = 1,928
Euro minus 388 Euro ‘Kindergeld’, which makes a total of 1,540 Euro.26 This sum
corresponds roughly to the gross wage of one full-time wage earner working at the
minimum wage (8.84 Euro). Under certain circumstances, additional allowances
can increase the amount of the transfer income. The transfer recipients can also
earn some additional income up to a certain amount. As a result, economic
incentives to work turn out to be rather mean for low-income earners, in some
cases even negative.27
The corresponding administrative reform, however, was not fully successful in
establishing effective ‘job centres’ or one-stop shops for all of the clients under the
clear responsibility of the PES. Due to the complex interrelationships under
German federalism and a political stalemate between the leading parties, a com-
promise emerged which again established fragmented responsibilities between the
26 http://www.bmas.de/DE/Themen/Arbeitsmarkt/Grundsicherung/Leistungen-zur-Sicherung-des-
Lebensunterhalts/2-teaser-artikelseite-arbeitslosengeld-2-sozialgeld.html; download 07 May 2018.
27 A single person without child would receive 737 Euro (416+321 accommodation); a single person
with a child up to four years old would receive 922 Euro (416+150 [‘Mehrbedarf’]+240 [child]+464
[accommodation]-194 [child allowance]-154 [subsistence allowance]). The deduction of child and
subsistence allowance violate the principle of inclusion because such transfers are to be considered as
citizens’ right.
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PES and the local authorities with respect to the recipients of ‘basic security’.28
Long-term unemployed who are disadvantaged either by age, low skills or limited
work capacities, therefore, still have few chances to transit to a sustainable job with
a decent income. Furthermore, the PES’ or the job centres’ staff administering
activation programmes are often not qualified enough or are overloaded; many
having only fixed-term contracts. Thus, long-term unemployment is still at a level
of about one third of total unemployment, and a growing part of these people are
unemployed for longer than four years. There remains also the problem of the
working poor, whose earnings (often despite full-time work) fall below the mini-
mum income and who therefore receive ‘basic security’ to top up their incomes
(currently about 800,000). Finally, the procedures of calculating the
‘Grundsicherung’ became extremely bureaucratic leading to many individual suits
against the false or delayed decisions of the Hartz IV administration.
The impact of this part of Schröders reform – often neglected by critical
opponents – was an improvement of the inclusion in the labour market in
two respects: First, more jobseekers (unemployed) are now covered by the
broader unemployment insurance (ALG I and ALG II) system: the coverage
increased from 79% (2003) to 92% (2015), although the share of ALG I
recipients declined from 38 to 26%, whereas the share of AGL II recipients
increased from 41 to 66%29; second, all ALG II recipients are now included in
the system of ‘active labour market policy’, although to some extent under
less favourable conditions than ALG I recipients (e.g. excluded from sup-
ported start-up measures). Despite these positive features, this part of the
Schröder reforms gained such a bad reputation that ‘Hartz IV’ became the
stereotype for a ‘neoliberal’ policy that eventually broke the neck of the
Social Democratic Party.
2.4 TRANSITIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT AND FAMILY WORK
Under the inclusive growth perspective, issues of equal opportunity for women
and work-life-balance become crucial. The Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz of 2000
made it easier to arrange part-time contracts and to ensure principles of inclusion
such as equal treatment in terms of wages, dismissals and social protection. As in
many other EU Member States, part-time jobs increased steadily, in particular for
women, and this employment dynamic is – in contrast to other forms of non-
standard work – unbroken. One of the hottest issues in the recent political debate
28 The majority of jobcentres at the regional level are cooperative ‘Arbeitsgemeinschaften’ between PES and
the municipalities; a smaller part is run only by municipalities.
29 These figures are calculated from Table IV. D.1, Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Arbeitsmarkt 2015, 112.
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was the intention of the new government (enforced by the social democratic party)
to establish an effective right to intermediate part-time work (‘Brückenteilzeit’)
which means the right to take part-time work and to return into full-time under
equal conditions. The law, finally, was enacted in October 2018 with some
compromises: All workers in companies with more than forty-five employees are
now entitled to reduce working time for one to five years and to return to full-
time; however, only one of fifteen employees can actually realize this right in firms
up to 200 employees.
The reform of parental leave in 2007 made part-time work for men slightly
more attractive than before. The new parental leave allowance (‘Elterngeld’) is
inclusive in as far as it also covers the income risk due to transiting into full
‘inactivity’ or to intermediate part-time work due to parental care work. In
other words, income loss due to full-time or part-time leave is now insured,
like in the case of ‘full-time’ unemployment, by 67% of the former net wage
income. The take-up conditions involve to some extent a kind of gender risk-
sharing, yet still uncomplete: two of the fourteen months in which Elterngeld is
paid, are reserved for the partner not taking the bulk of the leave – usually the
father. Such a leave allowance might also be considered as an element of
employment insurance although it is formally not included in UI and is not
financed by individual or employer’s contributions. Moreover, the entitlements
are portable from one employer to another and to any other location in the
country.30
In 2015, this law was supplemented by another innovative element. The
‘Elterngeld Plus’ now supports all those parents who want to work even during
the time of receiving this allowance. In this way, mothers and fathers have the
possibility to extend the (pro rate) supported time of parental leave up to two years:
One month Elterngeld doubles to two months Elterngeld Plus: If both parents share
child care equally by working twenty-five to thirty hours per week, they receive
four additional months, called Partnerschaftsbonus. The take-up of the new scheme
is very encouraging, and the new government allocated 6.4 billion Euro to this
item in 2018.
The inclusive impact of the last labour market reforms in Germany in
quantitative terms was much stronger for women than for men; it was also
larger compared to EU28 (Table 1): First, female unemployment improved and
is now significantly below the level of men (2.6% women v. 3.4% men).
Female labour force participation rocketed within the eighteen-year period
30 For details and evaluation see Anette Bergemann & Regina T. Riphahn, Maternal Employment Effects of
Paid Parental Leave, IZA Discussion Paper No. 9073 (2015), SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2612325.
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from 56.9 to 68.2%, whereas the labour force participation rate of men only
slightly improved from 73.2 to 77.1%; the gender gap thereby diminished from
21.3 to 8.9% age points. The corresponding gender gap at the EU28 level also
improved but is still at 11.5%. Most of this inclusion or gender gap reduction,
however, was obtained through non-standard work, in particular part-time
work which is now far beyond the level of EU28 (38.7 v. 26.9%). With respect
to regular work, German women are now even below the EU28 level (26.9%
v. 29.5%); correspondingly, the German gender gap between men and women
related to standard employment only slightly improved from 23.9 to 23.5% age
points.
2.5 TRANSITIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT AND RETIREMENT
Transitions to early retirement only for age reasons have been starkly reduced
since the labour market reforms under Schröder. In the 1990s it was not
unusual, in particular for men, to retire early in age fifty-five or fifty-eight
supported by generous transfers or golden handshakes. Later, under the first
grand coalition, the retirement age was even lifted from sixty-five to sixty-
seven, stepwise to be implemented from cohort to cohort until 2029. The last
grand coalition, however, eased again the possibility to retire at sixty-three for
people who had completed forty-five years of continuous employment covered
by social security. Nevertheless, this little reform against the spirit of increasing
working life time produced only a small dip in the rising trend of the average
retirement age, which increased from about sixty-two (2000) to sixty-four (2016),
slightly more for women than men.
Transitions to early retirement due to health problems (Erwerbsminderung),
however, still make up 18% of all retirement flows (20% in 2000), with an average
retirement age of fifty-two for men and fifty-one for women.31 The employment
rate for people with restricted work capacity is only 35%, and the unemployment
rate is one of the highest and above the EU28 average of 18%.32 The number of
severely disabled people who are unemployed rose by 1.2% from 2009 to 2016,
although total unemployment declined by 21.2%; during the same time period, the
number of participants in labour market policy measures fell by 35.4%.33
31 The dominant reason being 42.8% for psychic (and not, as expected, for physic) reasons, with an
upward trend of this share!.
32 Catrin Berger, Deutschland noch weit von UN-Zielvorgaben entfernt: Analysen zur Arbeitsmarktsituation von
behinderten Menschen in der Europäischen Union, 53 Informationsdienst Soziale Indikatoren (ISI) 1–7
(2015).
33 Figures from DGB, 10 Jahre UN-Behindertenrechtskonvention: Wie ist der Umsetzungsstand am deutschen
Arbeitsmarkt?, in Arbeitsmartkaktuell Nr. 8 (Dez. 2016); according to these figures, the activation ratio
for the disabled is only 18% compared to 25% of all unemployed.
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From the inclusive growth perspective, the labour market (policy and law)
reform for the integration of severely disabled people in 2001 was in theory
quite modern in anticipating some key principles of the UN Convention of
2008. The law stipulated the right of disabled people against their employer to a
job that enables them to utilize and to develop further their abilities and
knowledge; privileged access to firm-specific training; facilitation of their par-
ticipation in external training; a work environment that conforms to their
disability, and a workplace that is equipped with the required technical
facilities.34
This reform, which can be labelled as ‘negotiated capacity building through
accommodation’, corresponds to the general TLM strategy of extending work
opportunities through ‘making the market fit to workers’ with the aim of greater
social inclusion. This means enriching the standard employment contract by
imposing on employers duties of reasonable adjustment in favour of workers,
especially for those with reduced work capacity. In other words – and recently
also formulated by Simon Deakin in a joint publication with Alain Supiot – rather
than requiring the individual to be ‘adaptable’ to changing market conditions, the
employment contract requires that employment practices be adapted to the cir-
cumstances of the individual.35
It is evident that these kinds of adjustment duties require support through
procedural rules, for instance, negotiation through collective agreements, social
pacts or covenants between firms and other key actors in the local or regional
labour market. At the firm level, i.e. the case of workplace accommodation for
severely disabled people, German law envisages clear procedures to be taken in
order to ensure the maintenance of the employment relationship through, for
example, the involvement of rehabilitation experts, ‘integration management’ and
‘integration agreements’.36
Yet, as the figures above suggest, the reality in implementing such rules is far
from the ideal. Complementary regulations are necessary which – to some
extent – have been considered in a new and complementary law. Therefore, the
Bundesteilhabegesetz of 2016 stipulated or induced four important amendments:
34 SGB (Sozialgesetzbuch) IX, §81 (4).
35 Simon Deakin, Capacitas: Contract Law, Capabilities and the Legal Foundations, in Capacitas – Contract
Law and the Institutional Preconditions of a Market Economy 1–29 (Simon Deakin & Alan Supiot eds, Hart
Publishing 2009); this article provides good practices mainly related to disability policy in Europe, an
emphasis that correctly reflects the salience of this problem as also noted by Amartya Sen, The Idea of
Justice, Allan Lane & Penguin Books (2009).
36 §§ 83, 84 SGB IX. A pathbreaking pilot project for ‘Betriebliches Eingliederungmanagement’ is described
in Marianne Giesert, Tobias Reuter & Diana Reiter (2013), Neue Wege im Betrieblichen
Eingliederungsmanagement – Arbeits- und Beschäftigungsfähigkeit wiederherstellen, erhalten und fördern.
Evaluation des Betrieblichen Eingliederungsmanagements, DGB Bildungswerk (2013), which tried to
institutionalize a kind of ‘employability coaching’.
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(1) First, the priority of rehabilitation before pension, in other words, the
priority of the right to work against the right to income replacement.
(2) Second, if a new job or job maintenance is ensured through workplace
adjustment and/or personal assistance then the own work income
(wages) is to a large extent not counted against the social transfer
entitlements for disability – in other words: work pays.
(3) Third, works councils are now – through an amendment of the
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (§ 92, 3 (2)) – explicitly mandated to moni-
tor the work priority for the disabled or people with restricted work
capacities and to take initiatives for necessary adjustments measures.
(4) Fourth, jobcentres and pension agencies are – since the start of
2018 up to 2022 – entitled to apply for rehabilitation pilot pro-
jects for which a special budget position has been allocated (one
billion Euro).
Most impressive was the inclusion impact for mature aged people in the age
group sixty to sixty-nine: Labour force participation jumped from 13.3% to
38.8%, accompanied by a slight increase in unemployment, which reflects the
stronger labour market attachment of this group compared to the late 1990s
(Table 1). This dynamic was less impressive at the EU28 level where labour
force participation of mature aged people ‘only’ increased from 16% to 28.2%.
It is thereby remarkable that this positive dynamic was accompanied by a
parallel increase of both standard and non-standard employment: The non-
standard participation rate for Germany in this age group is now at 20.3%
(EU28: 14.3%), and the standard employment rate at the level of 17% (EU28:
12.3%).
To sum up: Germany’s overall inclusive growth in terms of labour market
participation was stronger than at the overall EU28 level. Yet this growth was
promoted to a large extent by non-standard employment. Beyond some other
negative aspects already mentioned (in particular erosion of labour market
security and diminishing social protection), it seems plausible that the follow-
ing outlook on inequality and poverty will turn out to be less favourable.
2.6 THE QUALITY SIDE OF THE German inclusive labour market policy
Inclusion in form of labour market participation might be a necessary condi-
tion for a decent living standard, but sufficient is this not. Income in form of
good and fair wages or remuneration is crucial, apart from immaterial factors
related to work (social recognition, pleasant work environment, learning
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opportunities, risk of accidents et al.). Related to its inclusive growth strategy,
the European Commission monitors this qualitative aspect through a set of
indicators which are represented in the following table, and in which
Germany is compared to the Eurozone (EU19) and the European Union
(EU28) (Table 2).
Table 2 Indicators of Qualitative Inclusion in Europe, 2005, 2010, 2016
Indicator Country 2005 2010 2016 Difference
(2016–2005)
Income Poverty
(% of population
<60% median)*
EU19
EU28
Germany
15.5
16.4
12.2
16.3
16.5
15.6
17.4
17.3
16.5
1.9
0.9
4.3
Material Poverty
(% of population with
severe material
deprivation)*
EU19
EU28
Germany
6.3
10.7
4.6
6.1
8.4
4.5
6.6
7.5
3.7
0.3
–3.2
–0.9
Earnings Capacity
Poverty
(% of pop. in
households with low
employment
intensity)*
EU19
EU28
Germany
9.8
10.3
12.0
10.4
10.3
11.2
11.1
10.5
9.6
1.3
0.2
–2.4
Income Inequality
(proportion S80/S20)
EU19
EU28
Germany
4.7
5.0
3.8
4.9
4.9
4.5
5.2
5.2
4.6
0.5
0.2
0.8
Source: European Commission, Employment and Social Developments 2017 and 2018; Tables in
Appendix, difference in percentage points.
* These are the three dimensions chosen by the European Commission as a weighted
benchmark for being at risk of poverty or exclusion (AROPE); for definitions see http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/People_at_risk_of_poverty_or_
social_exclusion (download: 02.04.2018).
As the table speaks for itself, only the main results shall be emphasized: The risk of
income poverty increased in Germany much faster than in the EU28 or EU19 by
4.3% points from 2005 to 2016, albeit from a level below the EU average. Material
deprivation decreased (-0.9), albeit at a low level (‘rich’ country), but declining
lesser than at the overall EU28 level. The increase in income inequality in
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Germany was one of the highest among EU Member States, again from a lower
level than the European average. The only favourable exception among the
selected indicators is earnings capacity poverty measured as the per cent of the
population living in households with low employment intensity: measured by this
indicator German performance improved, in contrast in particular to the
Eurozone, which is probably a reflection of the strong quantitative inclusion
impact of German employment policy.
So, is there an unavoidable trade-off between quantitative and qualitative
inclusion? It is the task of the final section to develop the idea of an inclusive
labour contract which might be the solution to overcome the trade-off and to
develop a virtuous (instead of a vicious circle) between quantitative and qualitative
inclusion.
3 THE INCLUSIVE LABOUR CONTRACT AS REGULATORY IDEA
The previous sections provided evidence that Germany’s success in terms of labour
force participation was partly impressive but mainly built on non-standard employ-
ment (NSE). So far, the dangerous elements of risks related to this form of
inclusion have been emphasized: precarious and dead-end jobs, rising inequality
and segmentation. This view is certainly justified by the facts, but a more opti-
mistic view might be also justified by pointing to the opportunity elements of risks
related to NSE, that is, enhancing productivity through increasing the variability of
employment relationships and greater sovereignty of workers for choosing the
most suitable form of employment relationship over the life course with changing
needs and preferences. The provocative news from the empirical part of the
underlying study to this essay is the observation that it is voluntary part-time in
particular (taken as an indicator of working-time flexibility over the life course)
which seems to be an important driver for a new ‘marriage’ of equity and
efficiency in the digital economy.37 Furthermore, Europe should not dismiss the
labour market complexity of the global world around its small continent which is,
to a large extent, still strongly characterized by informal employment relationships
with low social protection.38
Embracing more contractual complexity as an opportunity requires, however,
requires enhanced institutional capacities to respond to the new challenges of fair
risk-sharing at three levels: the legal, the financial and the organizational level. At
the legal level, a new labour standard based on the idea of an effective right to
37 See in particular tables 10 and 11 in Schmid, Europa in Arbeit, supra n. 4, at 68–72.
38 See also ILO, Non-standard Employment around the World: Understanding Challenges, Shaping Prospects,
ILO Publications (2016); Schmid, Towards an Employment Strategy of Inclusive Growth, supra n. 4, at
145–87.
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decent work beyond formal employment might be the solution. At the financial
level, social protection – in a digital economy – may rely less on wage-based
contributions and more on general taxation (including capital gains, wealth and
luxurious consumption). At the organizational level, negotiated flexicurity and
effective labour market services are at the core, like smart-matching demand and
supply, monitoring and evaluation, case management based on individualized
assessment, continuous training and vocational education, co-financing implemen-
ted within modern governance structures such as co-determination and participa-
tion in investment decisions. Germany, as shown above, provides some good
practices in this respect.
As far as the legal level is concerned, expanding the range of the labour
contract to all forms of work, also including unpaid but socially highly valued
work as proposed, for instance, by the Supiot Report Supiot,39 seems to be
the most radical and promising route for ensuring social protection to work-
ers. The main aim of this proposal is the move from protecting jobs to
protecting the employability of people, or from job security to labour market
security. Social security linked to traditional employment relationships would
be extended in the new standard to include income and employment risks
related to transitions between various employment and labour market statuses.
The legal core is the establishment of new social rights and new social
obligations on both sides of the labour market.
The coverage of the social rights would be new in that they would include
subjects that are unfamiliar to industrial wage-earners on which the traditional
standard employment relationship is built: the right to regular employability
assessment, to appropriate working hours including the right to request shorter
or longer working hours, to occupational redeployment, retraining or vocational
rehabilitation. Furthermore, a flexible job guarantee through the state would be an
accompanying element.40 In contrast to earlier job guarantees, this guarantee
would be flexible in three respects: First, individuals would be free to choose a
job offer by the state. Second, individuals could combine this right with various
‘non-standard’ forms of employment, e.g. involuntary part-time. Third, the guar-
antee could also take the form of subsidized employment in the (private) market
sector.
The scope of social rights would also be new since they would include not
only ‘standard’ wage-earners but also the ‘non-standard’ part-time workers, the
self-employed or semi-self-employed, the temp-agency workers, the marginal
39 Alain Supiot, Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe, Oxford
University Press (2016), second edition with a new preface in French by the author.
40 Anthony B. Atkinson, Inequality – What Can Be Done?, Har. Univ. Press (2015).
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workers, and even zero-hour contract workers. One example would be including
the risk of reduced earnings capacity in a way analogue to short-time work (of full-
time workers) covered by unemployment insurance. The income loss induced by
reduced working time (due to, for example, care obligations) could be compen-
sated by part-time unemployment benefits or – as in the German case – a wage-
related parental leave allowance. Such a benefit would also be helpful when related
to the increasing demand of care for the frail and elderly which, for example in
Germany, in its majority (three-fourths) is still provided within the family and
again predominantly by women.
The nature of social rights would be new because they often take the form of
vouchers, social drawing rights or personnel accounts, which provide transition
securities from one labour contract to another and allow workers to rely on
solidarity within defined and perhaps collectively bargained limits when exercising
their new freedom to act.
A good practice example of such coordinated flexibility is the German
collective agreement established in the chemical industry in April 2008, setting
up so-called demography funds. This overall framework agreement required all
employers to contribute an annual sum of 300 Euro for each employee into a fund,
which could be utilized after corresponding negotiations and deliberations at the
firm level for various aims, among others for training or retraining, for buying
occupational disability insurance or for early retirement, however, under the
condition of building a bridge for young workers entering employment. In
2015, instead of bargaining for an aggressive wage increase, trade unions success-
fully fought for a stepwise increase of employers’ contributions into this fund: 550
Euro in 2016 and 750 Euro in 2017, corresponding to an otherwise 0.9% wage
increase.
To the extent that these new rights enhance the range of individual choices, a
corresponding new field of individual responsibilities opens up. This dimension,
strangely enough, is not covered in the Supiot Report. Amartya Sen, however, is
quite outspoken in this respect: ‘Freedom to choose gives us the opportunity to
decide what we should do, but with the opportunity comes the responsibility for
what we do – to the extent that they are chosen actions. Since a capability is the
power to do something, the accountability that emanates from that ability – that
power – is a part of the capability perspective, and this can make room for demands
of duty – what can be broadly called deontological demands.’41
The coverage of social obligations arising from the extended room of indivi-
dual freedom to act would be new in that they would include subjects unfamiliar
in the traditional employment relationship: obligations to train and retrain both for
41 Sen, supra n. 35, at 19.
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employees as well as for employers to maintain employability or proper manage-
ment abilities; to actively search for a new job or accept a less well paid job under
fair compensating rules; to sickness prevention and occupational rehabilitation; to
reasonable workplace adjustments according to the capabilities of workers or to
changing working times according to the needs either related to the individual life
course or to volatile market demands of goods and services. A good example in this
direction are the reforms of the German law for severely disabled people, which
have been described above. It is evident that these kinds of adjustment duties
require support through collective agreements or social pacts between firms and
other key actors in the local or regional labour market with the support of modern
labour market services, which are still underdeveloped in Germany.
The scope of social obligations would also be new since they would
include not only certain categories of workers or employers but also the core
workers in open-ended contracts and all firms regardless of size and function.
The exemption of civil servants or the self-employed from contributing to
social security (especially pensions and unemployment insurance) as, for
instance, in Germany, would not be justified under the regulatory idea of an
inclusive labour contract. A good practice example is the obligation to work-
sharing in the event of cyclical troughs of demand if workers’ representatives
require this from the employer whereby, in turn, the law entitles them to ask
employers to work-share as an instrument to maintain the employment rela-
tionship. The German scheme of short-time work (Kurzarbeit) demonstrates
the usefulness of such a device for internal flexibility as well as the need to fine-
tune the contractual arrangements.42
The nature of social obligations would be new because they often take the
form of ‘voice’, involving negotiations at individual, firm, regional and branch
level in order to reach mutual agreements and to accept compromises in case of
different interests, so-called negotiated flexicurity.43 As many workers in NSE have
a limited voice, it is important to include measures that can strengthen their ability
to be heard and to negotiate effectively. Voice as an adjustment mechanism to
structural change involving high uncertainty is known in the literature on indus-
trial relations as legally acknowledged learning communities. Covenants are a good
42 See Joachim Möller, The German Labor Market Response in the World Recession – De-mystifying a Miracle,
42(4) ZAF (Zeitschrift für Arbeitsmarktforschung) 325–36 (2010); Donald Storrie, Temporary Agency
Work in the European Union, Foundation for the Improvement of Living Conditions (2012); Schmid,
Sharing Risks, supra n. 9, at 84–86.
43 Günther Schmid, Full Employment in Europe – Managing Transitions and Risks, Edward Elgar 317–22
(2008).
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practice case, which – for instance – are widely used as a governance instrument in
the Netherlands.44
4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study considered the German labour market policy and labour law reforms
under the perspective of inclusion. It provided, first, a comprehensive yet con-
densed and critical overview of the German reforms since they year 2000 struc-
tured along the lines of TLM and assessed in view of four normative principles of
inclusion. Exploiting the European Labour Force Survey in an original way, the
results of the German reforms could also be confronted with hard quantitative
indicators of inclusion in form of labour market participation rates. The result is
that the reforms promoted inclusion in a considerable way, in particular for
women and elderly, but mainly in form of risky employment relationships leading
to labour market segmentation, rising inequality and in-work poverty. To stem
against this trend, new risks related to NSE have to be included into the institu-
tional framework of labour market policy and social protection. At the legal level,
the concept of ‘inclusive labour contract’ could serve as a regulatory idea to take
fluid employment relationships over the life course as an opportunity rather than
only as a danger.
New social rights and obligations under this systemic reorientation would
increase in particular the internal flexibility of ‘standard’ employment as a func-
tional equivalent to external flexibility which often ends up in a precarious NSE.
But they would also include voluntary forms of NSE in a broader social protection
framework as currently exists, for instance, by extending the conventional unem-
ployment insurance to a system of employment insurance which also covers
income risks other than unemployment, such as voluntary or involuntary part-
time, short-time work, care and training leaves.
The establishment of new social rights and new social obligations according to
the regulatory idea of an inclusive labour contract would also ensure the develop-
ment of institutional capabilities that not only make workers fit to the market, but
that also make the market fit to the workers. The employment strategy of inclusive
growth should be based on the regulatory idea of a new labour standard which
goes beyond employment and includes all kinds of work that are socially valued or
even obligatory. The inclusive labour contract brings together the supply strategy
44 A covenant is an undersigned written agreement, or a system of agreements, between two or more
parties, at least one i.e. or represents a public authority, meant to effectuate governmental policy; see
more in Ton Korver & Günther Schmid, Enhancing Transition Capacities and Sustainable Transitions, in
Renewing Democratic Deliberation in Europe: The Challenge of Social and Civil Dialogue 23–55 (J. de
Munck, C. Didry, I. Ferreras & A. Jobert eds, Peter Lang 2012).
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of investments in human capabilities over the whole life course, and the demand
strategy of inclusive growth through job creation by proper fiscal and monetary
policies enhanced by the protected variability of labour contracts. This would also
be an essential element of a global social policy45 that aims at the prevention of a
vicious cycle or cut-throat global competition, originally described by the socialist
political activist, Ferdinand Lassalle, as the iron law of falling real net wages towards
an existence minimum.46
45 Deeming & Smith, supra n. 4.
46 Supiot, supra n. 39, at XXXVIII.
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